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MUNICIPAL-BASED DISCRIMINATION AND THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE:
UNITED BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION
TRADES COUNCIL v. MAYOR
OF CAMDEN
For years states have attempted to combat their unemployment
problems' by enacting legislation2 that gave employment priority on
publicly funded construction projects to residents of that state. Courts
have determined that state laws requiring private contractors who re-
ceive public works contracts to employ a stated percentage3 of state
1. The national unemployment rate is currently at an annual average of 7.1%. The
figure for Blacks is 15%. MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 1984, at 53. In August 1980, the
time when Camden, New Jersey, adopted the ordinance in question, the national unem-
ployment rate was 7.6%. The unemployment rate for Blacks and other minorities at
this time was 13.6%. MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 1980, at 68. Approximately 53% of
Camden residents were Black and 19.2% Hispanic. United Bldg. & Constr. Trade
Council v. Mayor of Camden, 88 N.J. 317, 327, 443 A.2d 148, 153 (1982) (citing 1980
U.S. Census Bureau statistics for the City of Camden.) Thus, Camden's unemployment
problem was more severe than in most areas.
2. ALA. CODE § 39-3-2 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.010 (1982); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 34-302 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 14-607 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 8-17-101 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-52 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 6913 (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 103-57 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 44-1001 (1977);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 73.3 (West Supp. 1984-85); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:2185 (West
1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1301 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-503
(1957); MISS. CODE ANN. § 31-5-17 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-2-403 (1983);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 338.130 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-07-20 (1978); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 61, § 10 (West Supp. 1984-85); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 154 (Purdon 1964);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 5-19-6 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-3-33 (1953); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 27 (1968); W. VA. CODE § 5A-3-44 (Supp. 1984); WYo. STAT.
§ 16-6-104 (1982).
These statutes are of two basic types: those that require the contractor to employ a
stated percentage of state residents, and those that require the contractor to prefer state
residents over nonresidents. See infra notes 3-4.
Courts have invalidated five other state statutes: ILL. REV. STAT. 48, § 271 (1983);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 26 (West 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:9-2 (1975);
N.Y. LABOR LAW § 222 (McKinney 1965) (repealed 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 39.16.005 (Supp. 1985). See infra note 5.
3. Colorado's statute is typical:
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residents or give state residents "hiring preference" 4 violate the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the Constitution.5 In United Building
and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden,6 the Supreme
Court extended the scope of the privileges and immunities clause to
city ordinances that discriminate on the basis of municipal residency.
A Camden, New Jersey, municipal ordinance7 required contractors
Whenever any public works financed in whole or in part by funds of the state,
counties, school districts, or municipalities of the state of Colorado are undertaken
in this state, Colorado labor shall be employed to perform the work to the extent of
not less than eighty percent of each type or class of labor in the several classifica-
tions of skilled and common labor employed on such project or public works. 'Col-
orado labor', as used in this article means any person who is a resident of the state
of Colorado, at the time of employment, without discrimination as to race, color,
creed, sex, age, or religion except when sex or age is a bona fide occupational
qualification.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-17-101 (Supp. 1983).
4. Connecticut's statute is typical: "In the employment of mechanics, laborers or
workmen in connection with any public works project.., preference shall be given to
persons who are residents of the state, and, if they cannot be obtained in sufficient num-
bers, then to residents of other states." CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 31-52a(a).
5. U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Id.
Cases holding that state laws violated the clause include: Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S.
518 (1978); People ex reL Bernardi v. Leary Const. Co., 102 Ill. 2d 295, 464 N.E.2d
1019 (1984); Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 81
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2039, 425 N.E.2d 346 (1981); Neshaminy Constructors, Inc. v. Krause,
187 N.J. Super. 174, 453 A.2d 1359 (1982); Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514,
399 N.E.2d 909, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Abrams v. Salla, 446
U.S. 909 (1980); Laborers Local Union No. 374 v. Felton Const., 98 Wash. 2d 121, 654
P.2d 67 (1982). The Massachusetts Supreme Court, responding to a question posed by
the state senate, concluded that a proposed bill requiring contractors to employ 80%
Massachusetts residents would violate the privilege and immunities clause. Opinion of
the Justices to the Senate, 393 Mass. 1201, 469 N.E.2d 821 (1984).
6. 104 S.Ct. 1020 (1984).
7. CAMDEN, N.J., ORDINANCE MC 1653 § C (IV)(b) required that on all construc-
tion projects funded by the city: "The developer/contractor, in hiring for jobs, shall
make every effort to employ persons residing within the City of Camden but, in no
event, shall less than forty percent (40%) of the entire labor force be residents of the
City of Camden."
The city passed the ordinance on August 28, 1980. This was the second ordinance in
Camden's affirmative action program. The first ordinance, adopted July 24, 1980, pro-
vided that every public works contractor "shall make every effort to employ not less
than 25% minority workers in the utilization of all trades, as tradesmen, journeymen
and apprentices, in performances of his/her contract, whether or not the work is sub-
contracted." United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 88 N.J. 317,
323, 433 A.2d 148, 151 (citing Camden ordinance). Appellant originally challenged
both ordinances on constitutional and statutory grounds. 88 N.J. at 321, 443 A.2d at
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and subcontractors working on city construction projects to have Cam-
den residents comprise at least forty percent of their work force.8 The
city adopted the ordinance as part of a state-wide affirmative action
program.9 The New Jersey Treasury Department' ° approved the ordi-
nance pursuant to state law. I" United Building and Construction
Trades Council of Camden County (United Building), an association of
150. On appeal to the Supreme Court, however, the council dropped the challenge to
the 25% minority hiring goal.
The provisions of the Camden ordinance applied "Wherever the City of Camden
spends funds derived from any public source for construction contracts or where the
City of Camden confers a direct financial benefit upon a party, but excluding the grant
of a property tax abatement, the fair market value of which exceeds $50,000.00. .. "
CAMDEN N.J., ORDINANCE MC 1650 § 11 (1980). Originally the Camden ordinance
also applied to the development and construction of all residential housing of four units
or less, but the city narrowed the scope of the ordinance by amendment.
8. Originally the ordinance contained a one-year residency requirement in order for
a person to be considered a Camden resident. In July, 1983, Camden deleted this re-
quirement and defined a resident as "any person who resides in the City of Camden."
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 52 U.S.L.W. 4187, 4189
(citing Brief of Appellees, Mayor and Council of the City of Camden, at A-5).
For a discussion of durational residency requirements, see Note, Durational Resi-
dence Requirements from Shapiro Through Sosna" The Right to Travel Takes a New
Turn, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 622 (1985); Note, Residency Requirements for City Employ-
ees: Important Incentives in Today's Urban Crisis, 18 URB. L. ANN. 197 (1980); Note,
Municipal Employee Residency Requirements and Equal Protection, 84 YALE L.J. 1684
(1975).
9. New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination established a comprehensive affirma-
tive action program in the awarding of public works contracts. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-
31 to 5-38 (West 1976). The act provides that no public works contract shall be
awarded to a contractor unless he agrees to abide by an affirmative action program
approved by the State Treasurer. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-32. The state or city award-
ing the public works contract must include a specified affirmative action provision in the
contract, and the contractor must submit a specific affirmative action plan to the State
Treasurer for approval. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-33, 5-34. The act also empowers the
treasurer to require state and local agencies awarding public work contracts to submit
affirmative action programs. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-36(c).
10. Chief Affirmative Action Officer Carl G. Briscoe approved the ordinance on
November 24, 1980, for a period of one year. 83 N.J. at 324, 443 A.2d at 151.
11. The law conditioned approval on the affirmative action program's compliance
with minimum state requirements. The law empowered the State Treasurer to deter-
mine percentages of minority populations across the state and to promulgate guideline
percentages for determining the adequacy of affirmative action programs submitted for
approval. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-36(a), (b). The State Treasurer set the Camden
County goal at 20%. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 27-7.3. The minority hiring goal
enacted by the city and approved by the State Treasurer was 25%. Presumably, the
resident hiring quota of 40% enacted by the city "could only increase the likelihood
that any contractor [would] meet the State Treasurer's minority hiring goals." 88 N.J.
at 329, 443 A.2d at 154.
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labor organizations, appealed12 the Department's decision claiming
that the ordinance violated the privileges and immunities clause.' 3 The
New Jersey Supreme Court14 held that the clause did not apply be-
cause the ordinance discriminated on the basis of municipal, rather
than state, residency. 5 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
holding that a municipal ordinance was subject to the strictures of the
privilege and immunities clause. 16
A primary purpose of the privileges and immunities clause in the
Constitution is to insure that states will not impose burdens upon indi-
viduals of other states engaged in trade or commerce.1 7 In Corfield v.
12. The Council filed a Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Division challenging
the final determination of the Chief Affirmative Action Officer. 88 N.J. at 324, 443
A.2d at 151.
13. Appellant raised several grounds on appeal: (1) the State Treasurer acted
outside the scope of his authority under the Law Against Discrimination; (2) the State
Treasurer abused his discretion in approving Camden's goal; (3) the approval of the
minority hiring goal violated the equal protection clause; and (4) the approval of the
resident hiring quota violated the commerce clause, the privileges and immunities
clause and was preempted by state statute.
14. 88 N.J. 317, 443 A.2d 148.
15. The New Jersey Supreme Court relied primarily on the fact that there were
New Jersey residents disadvantaged to the same extent as the Council. The court stated
as follows:
Clearly, the Camden affirmative action plan does not aim primarily at out-of-state
residents. It almost certaintly affects more New Jersey residents not living in Cam-
den than it does out-of-state residents. Because the Camden ordinance does not
affect 'the States' . . . treatment of each other's residents,' [citation omitted], it does
not violate any privilege of state citizenship.
Id. at 341-42, 443 A.2d at 160.
16. 104 S.Ct. at 1029.
17. The fourth article of the Articles of Confederation, upon which the Framers
based the privileges and immunities clause, provided:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these
States . . . shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and egress to and
from any other State, any shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and com-
merce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants
thereof.
I U.S.C. XXXIX (1982) (emphasis added).
There is evidence that the Framers of the Articles of Confederation contemplated two
distinct privilege guarantees: one that assured the free inhabitants of each state the
fundamental, natural rights of free citizens in the several states; and another that guar-
anteed interstate equality to merchants and others. The original draft of Article IV was
based on two separate privilege provisions. 5 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CON-
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Coryell,'8 the first federal case to interpret the clause, the court held
that the privileges and immunities covered by the clause included all
fundamental and inherent rights. 9 The court recognized the pursuit of
employment as a fundamental right.2" Corfield is notable because the
court fashioned a framework for privileges and immunities analysis.
Instead of applying the privileges and immunities clause to protect fun-
damental rights, however, the court upheld New Jersey's exclusion of
noncitizens from state-owned oyster beds by relying on the common
ownership doctrine.2 ' This doctrine provides that the right to certain
property located in a state rests in the state or its citizens, and may be
kept for their exclusive use.22 Thus, despite Corfield's far reaching
view of the rights protected by the clause, early decisions rarely invali-
dated statutes on privileges and immunities grounds.2 3
GRESS 547 (1906). The Framers of the Constitution, however, did not disclose whether
they intended to retain both privilege guarantees in Article IV, § 2, ch. 1.
18. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). Several state courts interpreted
the clause before Corfield. See Douglas v. Stephens, 1 Del. Ch. 465 (1821) (privileges
and immunities protected were the basic, fundamental, natural rights of men); Camp-
bell v. Morris, 3 Harr. and McHen. 535 (1797) (Court of Appeals of Maryland) (indi-
cating that the clause protects "personal rights"); Murray v. McCarty, 16 Va. (2 Munf.)
393 (1811) (holding that the clause protects natural rights, such as the freedom to ac-
quire property).
19. Justice Washington made a partial list of rights protected by the clause:
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state,
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in
the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal;
and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other
citizens of the state . ...
6 F. Cas. at 552.
For an early discussion of the rights protected under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, see Meyers, The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States, 1
MICH. L. REV. 286 (1902).
20. See supra note 19.
21. 6 F. Cas. at 552.
22. Id. Justice Washington stated:
[I]t would, in our opinion, be going quite too far to construe the grant of privileges
and immunities of citizens, as amounting to a grant of a cotenancy in the common
property of the state, to the citizens of all the other states. Such a construction
would, in many instances, be productive of the most serious public inconvenience
and injury, particularly, in regard to those kinds offish, which, by being exposed to
general use, may be exhausted.
Id.
23. See, e.g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (law prohibiting noncitizens
from planting oysters in Virginia waters held valid); Benentt v. Boggs, 3 F. Cas. 221
(C.C.D. N.J. 1830) (No. 1,319) (New Jersey statute that discriminated against nonresi-
1986]
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The Supreme Court limited the broad language of Corfield in Paul v.
Virginia.24 In Paul, the Court upheld a Virginia statute that prohibited
the sale of insurance policies by foreign insurance companies unless
they obtained a license and placed money on deposit with the state.
The Court recognized that the clause protected freedom from discrimi-
nating legislation, the right to enter into and exit from other states,
freedom to buy and enjoy property, and the pursuit of happiness.25
The Court, however, determined that the privileges and immunities
clause was not designed to secure all privileges enjoyed by citizens of
one state to citizens of other states.16 A state's own citizens could en-
joy exclusively those privileges not listed in Paul.27
Although Paul clearly established the types of privileges worthy of
protection, early decisions interpreting the privileges and immunities
clause were inconsistent.28 The confusion stemmed from application of
the common ownership theory to situations in which the nonresident
asserted that the statute in question infringed upon a protected privi-
lege. For example, in McCready v. Virginia,29 a Virginia statute re-
dent fishermen held valid); State v. Medbury, 3 R.I. 138 (1855) (Rhode Island statute
prohibiting the taking of oysters by nonresidents held valid).
24. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) (statute requiring corporations incorporated else-
where to deposit bonds in order to obtain license found not to be in violation of the
privileges and immunities clause).
25. Id. at 180.
26. Id. For a critical discussion of Justice Field's interpretation of the scope of the
Clause, see Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause by Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1967) (arguing that
the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV has been misinterpreted by the
Supreme Court and misunderstood by scholars ever since Paul v. Virginia was decided).
27. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180. Justice Field stated:
[T]he privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each State in the several
States, by the provision in question, are those privileges and immunities which are
common to the citizens in the latter States under their constitution and laws by
virtue of their being citizens. Special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own
states are not secured in other States by this provision. It was not intended by the
provision to give to the laws of one State any operation in other States.
Id.
28. Compare Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418 (1871) (statute requiring nonresident
traders doing business within the state to first purchase $300 license found unconstitu-
tional) with McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (law prohibiting noncitizens from
planting oysters in Virginia waters held valid). See also Note, Construction Workers
Residency Requirements: A Constitutional Response, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 461, 471
(1982).
29. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
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stricted access to oyster beds in Virginia waters to its own citizens.3"
The Supreme Court held that state ownership rights subordinated out-
of-state watermen's privilege of employment. The Court stated that
"citizens of one State are not invested by this clause of the Constitution
with any interest in the common property of the citizens of another
State."3
The Supreme Court's decision in Toomer v. Witsell32 eliminated
much of the confusion. In Toomer, a South Carolina statute required
nonresident shrimpers to pay a license fee one hundred times greater
than the fees paid by resident shrimpers.33 In finding the statute un-
constitutional, Chief Justice Vinson articulated a two-prong test.34 For
a statute to pass the test, the state must show that "noncitizens consti-
tute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed."35 The
state also must demonstrate that there is "a reasonable relationship be-
tween the danger represented by non-citizens, as a class, and the severe
discrimination placed upon them."3 6 South Carolina failed to satisfy
both parts of the test. The state failed to prove that nonresidents used
better fishing methods, operated larger boats or escaped prosecution
more easily than residents.37 Furthermore, even if the state had shown
these facts, the licensing fee was not reasonably related to these
problems.3 The Toomer test remains intact as the definitive standard
courts use in applying the privileges and immunities clause.39
Two recent decisions have refined the Toomer test. The first, Austin
v. New Hampshire," invalidated New Hampshire's Commuter Income
Tax,41 which fell exclusively on nonresidents' income. In an important
30. Id. at 396.
31. Id. at 395.
32. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
33. Id. at 389.
34. The Court did not explicitly delineate a two-prong test. Subsequent state court
decisions, however, and the Supreme Court in United Building interpreted Toomer in
this manner. See Note, supra note 28, at 469.
35. 334 U.S. at 398.
36. Id. at 399.
37. Id. at 398.
38. Id. at 399.
39. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Baldwin v. Fish and Game
Comm'n 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Mullane v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952).
40. 420 U.S, 656 (1975).
41. N.H. REV. STAT, ANN. § 77-B:2 11 (1970). The act imposed a four percent tax
1986]
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footnote, the Court held that for purposes of privileges and immunities
analysis, the terms "citizen" and "resident" were interchangeable. 42
Thus, a statute that discriminates on the basis of either citizenship or
residency is subject to the privileges and immunities clause.
The second case, Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission,43 reaf-
firmed the principle that the privileges and immunities clause protects
only fundamental rights. In Baldwin, Montana's hunting license fees
for nonresidents was seven times higher than the fees imposed upon
Montana residents.' The court acknowledged that the scheme dis-
criminated against nonresidents, but held that recreational, big-game
hunting was not a fundamental right worthy of protection.45 Because
Toomer did not state explicitly whether a showing of fundamentality
was a necessary part of its test, Baldwin further refined the standard.
Another decision, Zobel v. Williams,46 shed further light upon the
applicability of the clause. An Alaska statute allocated state treasury
funds to state residents on the basis of their length of residency.47 The
Supreme Court held that the law only discriminated among different
classes of residents and therefore was not subject to the strictures of the
privileges and immunities clause.48 The Court viewed the scheme ex-
on nonresidents' New Hampshire derived income, but provided a $2,000 exemption. If
that income would be subject to a tax in the nonresident's home state, however, the
New Hampshire tax would be reduced so that it did not exceed the other tax.
42. Austin cleared up this earlier uncertainty. Compare Travis v. Yale & Town
Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 78-79 (1920) and Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 246-47
(1898), with Douglas v. New Haven R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 386-87 (1929) and La
Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1919).
43. 436 U.S. 371 (1978). For a thorough analysis of the Baldwin decision, see Note,
The Privileges and Immunities Clause: A Reaffirmation of Fundamental Rights, 33 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 691 (1979) (noting the reluctance of the Supreme Court to expand the
content of rights protected under the privileges and immunities clause of article IV and
the fourteenth amendment).
44. 436 U.S. at 374. In 1976 a Montana resident could purchase an elk hunting
license for $9, or he could buy a combination license granting various hunting privileges
for $30. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26-202.1(1), (2), (4) and 26-230 (Supp. 1977). To
hunt elk a nonresident was required to purchase a combination license for $224. MONT.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26-202.1(4), (12), and 26-230 (Supp. 1977). Therefore, to hunt elk
in 1976, a nonresident paid either 71/2 or 25 times as much as a resident.
45. 436 U.S. at 388.
46. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
47. Id. at 57. The statute provided that each citizen 18 years of age or older would
receive one dividend unit per year of residency subsequent to 1959. Each dividend unit
was worth $50. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 43.23.010 (Supp. 1981).
48. 457 U.S. 59 n.5 (1982). The majority held that although the law violated the
equal protection clause, the privileges and immunities clause did not apply. The Court
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clusively as a form of intrastate discrimination.49 Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion,5" however, rested on privileges and immunities
grounds. She argued that even though the statute discriminates among
classes of residents, in effect, someone who moves to Alaska "labors
under a continuous disability"51 because of his prior residence in an-
other state. The fact that the discrimination unfolded only after the
nonresident established residency did "not insulate Alaska's scheme
from scrutiny."52 Notwithstanding Justice O'Connor's concurrence,
the Zobel decision is significant because it illustrates the Court's hesi-
tancy to apply the clause to intrastate discrimination cases.53
As refined by Austin and Baldwin, courts have applied the Toomer
test to invalidate state laws that discriminate against nonresidents in
employment opportunities. 4 In Hicklin v. Orbeck,55 a unanimous
Court applied the Toomer analysis to the "Alaska Hire" statute. 6 The
may have given cursory treatment to the privileges and immunities argument since it
already relied on equal protection grounds.
49. Id. The Court observed that the statute "does not simply make distinctions
between native-born Alaskans and those who migrate to Alaska from other States."
Because the statute "also discriminates among long-time residents and even native-born
residents," the clause did not apply. 457 U.S. at 59 n.5.
50. 457 U.S. at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 75.
52. Id.
53. Justice O'Connor did not view Alaska's scheme as involving only intrastate dis-
crimination. Her "continuous disability" approach incorporates the notion that out-of-
state residents are disadvantaged even before they move to Alaska. The majority of the
Court in United Building relied on Justice O'Connor's concurrence to support its state-
ment that "Camden's ordinance is not immune from constitutional review at the behest
of out-of-state residents merely because some in-state residents are similarly disadvan-
taged." 104 S.Ct. 1020, 1027.
54. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524-38 (1978) (invalidating an Alaska hir-
ing preference statute); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417-20 (1952) (invalidat-
ing a commercial fishing license scheme employed by the Territory of Alaska that
charged nonresidents ten times more than residents); Massachusetts Council of Constr.
Employers v. Mayor of Boston, 384 Mass. 466, 473-78, 425 N.E.2d 346, 352-55 (1981),
rev'd sub nom. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204
(1982) (invalidating a Massachusetts hiring preference statute); Neshaminy Construc-
tors v. Krause, 187 N.J. Super. 174, 453 A.2d 1359 (1982) (invalidating a New Jersey
hiring preference statute); Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 522-25, 399
N.E.2d 909, 913-15, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979) cert. denied sub nom. Abrams v. Salla,
446 U.S. 909 (1980).
55. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
56. ALASKA STAT. §§ 38.40.010-.090 (1977). Section 38.40.030(a) required that
.all oil and gas leases, easements or right-of-way permits for oil or gas pipeline pur-
poses, unitization agreements, or any renegotiation of any of the preceding to which the
1986]
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statute favored Alaska residents over nonresidents for any employment
contract generated by state-owned oil and gas leases." The Court
viewed the law as a far-reaching attempt to force private employers
benefitting from Alaska's oil to favor Alaska residents in making em-
ployment decisions." The state failed to prove that nonresidents were
the peculiar source of Alaska's unemployment problem.59 Further-
more, the statute did not bear a substantial relationship to the evil that
nonresidents allegedly presented because it treated skilled and un-
skilled residents equally.6° The Court recognized that a state's owner-
ship of the property was a factor to be considered in the analysis, but
not a dispositive one.6 1 Several state courts have relied on Hicklin to
invalidate statutes granting preference to resident construction
workers.62
Employment preference statutes also have been challenged on com-
merce clause grounds. In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construc-
tion Employers6 the City of Boston required private contractors
participating in city-financed construction projects to fill fifty percent
of their positions with city residents. The Massachusetts Supreme
state is a party" contain a provision requiring the lessee to employ Alaska residents in
preference to nonresidents. An employer who failed to comply with the act could be
required to pay the rejected employee triple his lost wages. Id. at § 38.40.070.
57. Id. at § 38.40.030.
58. 437 U.S. at 531.
59. Id. at 526.
60. Id. at 527. Alaska argued that nonresidents were the cause of its high unem-
ployment rate because they possessed higher skills than the unemployed residents, many
of whom were Eskimos and Indians. 437 U.S. at 527 n.10. The Court held that because
"Alaska Hire" gave preferential treatment to both skilled and unskilled residents, it was
not reasonably likely to combat the problem allegedly caused by nonresidents. Id. at
527-28.
61. Id. at 528-29. The fact that a unanimous Court placed little emphasis on state
ownership suggests that employment is a highly protected right. Hicklin is the premiere
case in employment preference analysis because it emphasizes the importance of pro-
tecting nonresidents' rights to seek employment in a discriminating state. Because em-
ployment is a vigorously protected right, the Court in United Building could easily
disregard the fact that the privileges and immunities clause is phrased in terms of state
citizenship.
62. See Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers v. Mayor of Boston, 384 Mass.
466, 473-78 425 N.E.2d 346, 352-55 (198 1), rev'd on other grounds, 460 U.S. 204 (1983);
Neshaminy Constructors v. Krause, 181 N.J. Super 376, 380-85, 437 A.2d 733, 735-38,
afl'd, 187 N.J. Super. 174, 175, 453 A.2d 1359 (1982); Salla v. County of Monroe, 48
N.Y.2d 514, 522-25, 399 N.E.2d 909, 913-15, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878, 882-84 (1979), cert.
denied sub nom. Abrams v. Salla, 446 U.S. 909 (1980).
63. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
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Court found the mayoral order unconstitutional on commerce clause
grounds.' 4 The Supreme Court reversed and held the order valid.65
The Court found that the city acted as a market participant as opposed
to a market regulator. 66 Because the commerce clause acts as an im-
plied restraint only upon state regulatory powers, it did not apply.
67
Thus, United Building, decided one year later, was the Court's first
chance to apply the privileges and immunities clause to an ordinance
that discriminated on the basis of municipal residency.
In United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of
Camden, Camden argued that the privileges and immunities clause
does not apply to a municipal ordinance. 6' The city contended that the
clause applies solely to laws passed by a state and laws that discrimi-
nate on the basis of state citizenship. 69 The Court pointed out two
flaws with the city's reasoning. 0 First, the city's distinction between
municipal and state laws was tenuous because the State Treasurer had
approved the Camden ordinance.71 Second, a municipality is merely a
political subdivision of the state and therefore derives its authority
from the state.72 The Court held that a state could not accomplish an
64. 384 Mass. 466, 478, 425 N.E.2d 346, 354 (1981).
65. 460 U.S. 204, 215 (1983).
66. Id. at 214-15.
67. Id. at 210. The Court held that the adverse affect of implementing the mayor's
order upon construction firms that employed out-of-state residents was not relevant to
whether the city is a market participant or a market regulator. The Court stated that
the impact on out-of-state residents is relevant only after it is decided that the city is
regulating the market rather than participating in it. Id. The Court held that for pur-
poses of the commerce clause, everyone employed on a city public works project is "in a
substantial if informal sense, 'working for the city.'" Id. at 211 n.7. That these em-
ployees were "working for the city" indicated that the city was a market participant.
The Court did not decide whether the mayor's order violated the privileges and im-
munities clause. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the order violated the
clause, but the Council dropped the claim on appeal. The Supreme Court nevertheless
noted that the mayor's order, which applied to contracts involving only city funds, was
not as drastic as the coercion involved in Hicklin, which applied to all businesses that
benefitted from the economic ripple effect of Alaska's decision to develop its oil and gas
resources. Id. at 211.
68. 104 S.Ct. 1020, 1025 (1984).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1025-26.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1026. See also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256
(1974); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1968).
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unconstitutional act by delegating authority to its municipalities.73
Thus, the Court found the clause applicable to municipal ordinances.
The Court next addressed the argument that the privileges and im-
munities clause applies only to provisions that discriminate on the basis
of state citizenship.74 The Court concluded that municipal residency
classifications give rise to the same concerns as state residency classifi-
cations.7" An out-of-state resident is excluded from employment re-
gardless of whether the basis for discrimination is state or city
residency.76 The ordinance adversely affected New Jersey residents not
living in Camden,7 7 but the Court noted that these residents, unlike
out-of-state residents, have a remedy at the polls, which out-of-state
residents lack.78 Furthermore, out-of-state residents must "not be re-
stricted to the uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic processes and
official retaliation.",79
The Court criticized the dissent for asserting that adversely affected
residents would protect nonresidents at the polls.80 The court noted
that Camden had adopted its ordinance pursuant to state law, mani-
festing that residents already had failed to protect nonresidents.81 In
addition, a failure to apply the clause to any form of discrimination less
than statewide would provide states with a simple means for evading
the clause.8 2 As long as an ordinance was not phrased in terms of state
73. 104 S.Ct. at 1026.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1027.
77. Id. The Court noted that the disadvantaged in-state resident has no claim under
the privileges and immunities clause. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77
(1872) (rejecting a fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities challenge to a Lou-
isiana health law).
78. 104 S.Ct. at 1027.
79. Id. (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948)).
80. 104 S.Ct. at 1027.
81. Id.
82. Id. The Court stated as follows:
Suppose, for example, that California wanted to guarantee that all employees of
contractors and subcontractors working on construction projects funded in whole
or in part by state funds are state residents. Under the dissent's analysis, the Cali-
fornia legislature need merely divide the State in half, providing one resident-hiring
preference for Northern Californians on all such projects taking place in Northern
California, and one for Southern Californians on all projects taking place in South-
ern California. State residents generally would benefit from the law at the expense
of out-of-state residents; yet, the law would be immune from scrutiny under the
Clause simply because it was not phrased in terms of state citizenship or residency.
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citizenship, the ordinance would be immune from scrutiny.83
After determining that the Camden ordinance was subject to the
privileges and immunities clause, the Court applied the Toomer test.
The Court readily concluded that an out-of-state resident possessed a
fundamental interest in employment.84 On the narrower question of
whether a person's interest in employment on public works contracts in
another state is "fundamental," the Court refused to apply the White
decision to privileges and immunities analysis."5 The United Building
Court held that while the commerce clause acts as an implied restraint
upon state regulatory powers, the privileges and immunities clause im-
poses a direct restraint on state action in the interests of interstate
harmony.8 6 Therefore, the market-regulator market-participant dis-
tinction that is crucial under commerce clause analysis is not disposi-
tive under privileges and immunities analysis.87 Camden's activities as
a market participant does not preclude privileges and immunities
clause scrutiny.88 The Court concluded that the opportunity to seek
employment with private employers is sufficiently fundamental to fall
within the purview of the clause, even though the private employers are
engaged in public works projects. 89
Although the Court concluded that Camden's ordinance discrimi-
nated against a protected privilege, it was impossible to determine
whether Camden had met its burden under the Toomer test,90 because




84. Id. at 1028. The Court acknowledged that public employment was qualitatively
different than employment in the private sector. Nevertheless, the Court held that be-
cause the privileges and immunities clause imposed a direct restraint on state action, the
distinction did not render the clause inapplicable. Id. at 1028-29.
85. 104 S.Ct. at 1028.
86. Id,
87. Id. at 1028-29. The Court, relying on Hicklin, stated:
The fact that Camden is expending its own funds or funds it administers in accord-
ance with the terms of a grant is certainly a factor-perhaps a crucial factor-to be
considered in evaluating whether the statute's discrimination violates the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. But it does not remove the Camden ordinance completely




90. Id. at 1030. Under the Toomer test, Camden would be required to show that
non-Camden residents are the cause of Camden's high unemployment problem. Fur-
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lower courts never applied the test.91 Therefore, the Court remanded
the case to determine whether the city had a substantial reason for
discriminating against citizens of other states.92
In his dissent,9 3 Justice Blackmun reviewed the history of the privi-
leges and immunities clause and concluded that it was not concerned
with intrastate discrimination based on municipal residency. 94 He
placed particular reliance on the Zobel decision, arguing that the Zobel
Court refused to apply the clause because the law allocating treasury
funds adversely affected some in-state residents in a way that disadvan-
taged nonresidents as well.95 Blackmun contended that disadvantaged
in-state residents could turn to the state's political processes for relief96
and that this mechanism, in turn, would protect out-of-state resi-
dents.97 Thus, he would apply the clause only to situations "which
bear the same sort of practical relationship to a classification based on
state residence." 98
Justice Blackmun also disagreed with the majority's contention that
the ordinance received "state sanction and approval," 99 and that there-
fore the state's political processes were not effective in protecting out-
of-state citizens. Although the city established the ordinance pursuant
to state law, he argued that political pressure could force the city to
thermore, it would have to show that the 40% resident hiring quota was reasonably
calculated to solve the problem.
91. Id. at 1030. See 88 N.J. 317, 324, 443 A.2d 148, 151, rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 1020
(1984) for a review of the procedural disposition of the case.
92. 104 S.Ct. at 1030.
93. Id. at 1030-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1031-33. Justice Blackmun stated:
While the Framers thus conceived of the Privileges and Immunities Clause as an
instrument for frustrating discrimination based on state citizenship, there is no evi-
dence of any sort that they were concerned by intrastate discrimination based on
municipal residence. The most obvious reason for this is also the most simple one:
by the time the Constitution was enacted, such discrimination was rarely practiced
and even more rarely successful.
Id. at 1032.
95. Id. at 1033.
96. Id. at 1034.
97. Id. at 1034-35. Justice Blackmun supported his assertion by pointing out that
California and Georgia both repealed protectionist measures due to political pressure.
Id. at 1035.
98. Id. n.14. Justice Blackmun remarked that if a state established a resident hiring
preference, but excluded one remote county, the classification would come within the





United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Cam-
den presents a rational extention of the privileges and immunities
clause to city residency requirements. When the Framers drafted the
clause, " ' they were not concerned with intrastate discrimination based
on municipal residency.' 0 2  Nevertheless, all residency requirements
exclude out-of-state residents regardless of whether the discrimination
is city or state-based. To the nonresident, municipal residency classifi-
cations give rise to the same concerns as state residency requirements.
The Court properly disallowed a strict reading of the privileges and
immunities clause to sanction municipal-based discrimination.
The Court refused to conclude that the internal political processes of
a state would protect out-of-state residents. Even if a state's political
processes could protect nonresidents, as Justice Blackmun posited in
his dissent, the Court correctly followed Toomer in holding that out-of-
state residents should not have to rely on these "uncertain reme-
dies."' 03 Moreover, the dissent incorrectly relies on Zobel to conclude
that the clause does not apply to discrimination among state residents.
The Alaska statute at issue in Zobel discriminated only among state
residents. "o The state did not disadvantage nonresidents because state
residency determined one's right to receive a payment.10 5 Camden's
ordinance also discriminated among state residents, but more impor-
tantly, it correspondingly discriminated against nonresidents. This
corresponding discrimination is crucial to the Court's analysis, but dis-
counted by Justice Blackmun.
If the United Building Court declined to apply the clause to munici-
pal-based discrimination, states easily could evade the strictures of the
100. Id. Justice Blackmun also took issue with the majority's expression of his posi-
tion regarding the application of the clause to classifications that are less than statewide.
Justice Blackmun argued that "[t]he Clause exists to protect against those classifications
that a State's political process cannot be relied on to prevent .. " Id. at 1035 n.14. See
supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
101. For more information on how article IV of the Articles of Confederation be-
came the privileges and immunities clause, see 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, 317 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
102 104 S.Ct. at 1034. See supra note 94.
103. 104 S.Ct. at 1034.
104. Justice O'Connor disagreed. See supra note 53.
105. 457 U.S. at 75. The right to pursue employment is categorically different than
the right created by Alaska's legislature. The former exits independently of where one
resides; the latter does not exist unless one resides in Alaska. See id..
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clause by drafting numerous residency quotas for different sections of
the state. Justice Blackmun would remedy this problem by applying
the clause to situations "which bear the same sort of practical relation-
ship to a classification based on state residence."' 6 Courts would have
great difficulty applying this standard, however, because there are
many possible discrimination schemes. The protection of the privileges
and immunities clause should not depend on whether a state discrimi-
nates against enough of its own residents to make it appear to be intra-
state discrimination.
Finally, United Building does not frustrate the city's goal of reducing
inner-city unemployment."0 7 It merely subjects municipal residency
requirements to the Toomer test. 0 8 If Camden's goal is to increase
employment among blacks, it can do so through a minority hiring
goal. 109
United Building is noteworthy because it extends the privileges and
immunities clause beyond discrimination based solely on state resi-
dency. This decision will serve as a warning to state, county" 0 and
city governments that contemplate passage of protectionist laws.
United Building does not spell defeat for municipal affirmative action
programs. It does require, however, that a city use minority or resi-
dent hiring goals that will withstand scrutiny under the Toomer test.
United Building revives the privileges and immunities clause. This
106. 104 S.Ct. at 1035 n.14.
107. See supra note 1.
108. In dictum, Justice Rehnquist hinted that the Camden ordinance might pass the
test. Distinguishing the ordinance from the statute in Hicklin, he stated:
The Alaska Hire statute at issue in Hicklin v. Orbeck [citation omitted] swept
within its strictures not only contractors and subcontractors dealing directly with
the State's oil and gas; it also covered suppliers who provided goods and services to
those contractors and subcontractors. We invalidated the Act as an attempt to
force virtually all businesses that benefit in some way from the economic ripple
effect of Alaska's decision to develop its oil and gas resources to bias their employ-
ment practices in favor of the State's residents .... No similar 'ripple effect' ap-
pears to infect the Camden ordinance. It is limited in scope to employees working
directly on city public works projects.
104 S.Ct. at 1030.
109. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that Camden's 25% minority hiring
goal violated neither the United States nor the New Jersey Constitution. 88 N.J. 317,
337-38, 443 A.2d 148, 158 (1982). United Building did not appeal this portion of the
court's holding.
110. See Construction & Gen. Laborers Union v. St. Paul, 270 Minn. 427, 428-29,
134 N.W.2d 26, 28 (1965) for an example of an ordinance discriminating on the basis of
county residency.
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sparsely used constitutional provision is now a nonresident's best hope
for defeating protectionist measures of all types.
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